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FAIRNESS AND A CONSUMPTION-TYPE OR
CASH FLOW PERSONAL INCOME TAX
Alvin C. Warren, Jr.'*
In a recent article, Professor William Andrews proposed rejec-
tion of the accretion tax ideal in favor of a consumption-based tax
scheme. One of his reasons for preferring the consumption-type tax
model was its neutrality between persons who spend their income
currently and those who save for future consumption. In this
Comment, Professor Warren suggests that the neutrality of the con-
sumption-type tax is obtained at the cost of allowing income fron
wealth to escape taxation. Finding the consumption-based tax to be
analagous, if not identical, to a tax on wages alone, he rejects it as
an insufficient compromise of the various legitimate objectives of a
basic tax system.
W ILLIAM Andrews has recently set forth a model of a
consumption-type personal income tax as an alternative to
the existing tax and the prevailing accretion ideal.1 Under An-
drews' approach, individuals would be taxed on the basis of their
consumption, rather than the sum of consumption and accumula-
tion. To accomplish that result, the personal income tax would
be levied on a simple cash flow basis: business and investment
expenditures (including capital outlays) would be deductible
when made, while business and investment receipts (including
returns of capital) would be immediately and fully includable in
taxable income.2 Professor Andrews argues that such a tax not
only would be superior to the current income tax, but that it
would even be preferable to a truly comprehensive accretion-type
income tax.3  Considerations of administrative simplicity, eco-
nomic efficiency, and fairness all lead him to that conclusion. It
is the last part of his argument - that a consumption-type income
* Associate Professor of Law, Duke Law School; Visiting Associate Professor
of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School (974-75). B.A., Yale, 1966;
J.D., University of Chicago, 1969. The author would like to thank his colleague,
Daniel Halperin, for his comments.
1 Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HAuv.
L. Rrv. 1113 (x974) [hereinafter cited as Andrews]. Expenditure taxation has a
rich intellectual history among economists. See id. at Ix7 n.7.
2 See id. at 1149.
' The classic case for the accretion model is H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOIE
TAXATioN (1938). See also sources cited in Andrews at I13 n.r.
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tax is fairer than a true accretion-type income tax - which is
examined here.4
I. ACCUMULATION AS CONSUMPTION FOREGONE
Andrews begins his analysis of the fairness of a tax on income
received but not consumed by characterizing accumulation as
consumption foregone, and offers two reasons for its exclusion
from the tax base given that characterization. First, we are told
that the "primary, intended, real effect of any general revenue-
raising tax is to curtail some part of the private consumption of
economic resources that would otherwise occur, in order to free
those resources for public use, including redistribution to the
poor." ' Since "the purpose is to curtail consumption," it is "pre-
sumptively fair" to distribute the burden of the tax "in relation
to levels of consumption prior to the imposition of the tax." 1
This argument confuses the effect of a tax with the base for
measuring tax liability. Assuming a tax will be paid with resources
the taxpayer would otherwise consume7 does not indicate whether
it would be fairer to levy the tax on the basis of accretion, con-
sumption, wealth, or something else. If we thought a tax levied
on the basis of waistlines were fair, it could still be collected in
dollars (that is, resources that would otherwise be consumed)
rather than pounds of flesh.' Later in his article, Andrews him-
self advocates, as a matter of fairness, a tax on the transfer of
property between generations,9 a base quite different from levels
of consumption.
If, however, as Andrews suggests, the curtailment of consump-
tion is not only the effect of any general revenue-raising tax, but
also its purpose, then it might follow that the tax burden should
be allocated in accordance with consumption levels. But why
should it be assumed that the purpose of any general revenue-
raising tax is to curtail consumption, as opposed to curtailing con-
sumption and accumulation, redistributing wealth, or something
else? Andrews does not indicate the premise on which his assump-
4 As Andrews' equity and efficiency arguments are presented together, some of
their common components will necessarily be discussed in the text, but no con-
clusion is intended regarding the merits of the efficiency analysis.
'Id. at ix65-66.
6 Id.
"Andrews concedes that some persons may pay taxes without reducing current
consumption, but maintains that a consumption-type tax will be fair "because it
will impose the same increase in the price for maintaining any particular level of
consumption . . . ." Id. at 1166-67.
'The waistline example is taken from E. ROLPH & G. BREAK, PUBLIC FINANCE
179 (ig6i).
9 Andrews at 1172.
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tion rests, and without some acceptable explanation, assertions
regarding the tax's purpose are not persuasive in weighing the
relative fairness of alternative tax bases. And even if reduction of
consumption were conceded to be the principal objective of tax-
ation, it might still be possible to accomplish that goal by levies
on bases other than consumption alone.'" But, perhaps by stating
that a consumption tax is "presumptively" fair, it is only meant
that the postulated purpose and effect of the tax is a tentative
measure of its fairness, subject to reevaluation when other equity
goals, such as mitigation of disparities in wealth, are considered.
In any event, the ultimate fairness of a basis for taxation simply
cannot be derived from what is collected when the tax is imposed.
The second reason for not taxing accumulation when it is
characterized as consumption foregone is that accumulation gen-
erally represents the market value of the "excess of what one has
contributed to production in a particular period, in labor or capital
or both, over what he has withdrawn for private consumption
during that period, and there is no reason to tax a person on that
excess." U The only explanation given by Andrews for not taxing
it is to quote Hobbes' well-known question: 12
For what reason is there that he which laboureth much, and
sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more
charged than he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth
all he gets; seeing the one has no more protection from the
Common-wealth, than the other?
While Hobbes' question is certainly pertinent, it hardly demon-
strates that there is no reason to tax accumulation. Nor is Hobbes'
original rationale for taxation - "to defend private men in the
exercise of their several trades, and callings" 1"- much help in
deciding the fairest means of financing modern government. Since
Hobbes' sovereign would use tax receipts to protect "the enjoy-
ment of life, which is equally dear to poor and rich," the poor
would be as indebted to the government for defense of their lives
as the rich "saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor,
may be debtors not only for their own persons but for many
more." 14 Hobbes' argument not only contemplates a considerably
narrower range of governmental functions than that prevailing
in contemporary democracies, but it also assumes that taxes are
to be levied in accordance with benefits received from the govern-
"°See A. PREST, PUBLIC FINANCE 129 (i96o).
l Andrews at II66.12T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 298 (A. Lindsay ed. 195o).
13 Id.
14 Id.
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ment - a standard long since replaced by ability to pay, whether
that means accretion, consumption, wealth or whatever."
More importantly for present purposes, the second reason for
not taxing accumulation as consumption foregone suffers the fatal
defect that in our society "the excess of what one has contributed
to production" is not lost to the contributor. Rather, as Andrews
puts it, a saver retains "the claim against future output repre-
sented by his accumulated income," 11 since savings remain avail-
able for the accumulator's future disposition. Thus accumulation
is not really "consumption foregone" after all. It is consumption
deferred, and we must turn to an examination of Andrews' argu-
ment for its exclusion from the tax base on that characterization.
II. ACCUMULATION AS CONSUMPTION DEFERRED
A. Discrimination Against Future Consumption
What Andrews calls "the most sophisticated argument" in
favor of a consumption-type income tax is that such a tax is "more
appropriate because it ultimately imposes a more uniform burden
on consumption, whenever it may occur, than does an accretion-
type tax." "7 Neutrality with respect to consumption is important
for Andrews "not only because it promotes efficiency in the alloca-
tion of income, but because it keeps the tax from bearing more
heavily on one person than another on account of differences in
need or taste for particular goods or services, now or in the
future." 18
While Andrews is clearly right in asserting that an accretion-
type tax creates a heavier ultimate burden in relation to future
consumption than in relation to present consumption, his selection
of taxpayers to illustrate the discrimination is somewhat puzzling.
The example given is that of a taxpayer who puts aside $ioo of
current earnings for retirement. Invested at 9% compound in-
terest, that sum will grow to $Soo after 24 years. A consumption
tax of 33% would leave the retiree with $533 to spend while an
accretion tax of 33% imposed on the initial $ioo and on the
annual increase in value would leave only $267 after 24 years.19
Andrews suggests that the "logic" of a consumption-type tax is
that a 33% taxpayer who would have had $8oo to spend in the
1" The Iobbesian view also assumes it is better to contribute to the common
pool than to withdraw from it, a judgment embraced in N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDI-
TURE TAX 53 (x955) and, more cautiously, in Andrews at 1174.
6 Andrews at 1167.
27Id.
's d. at 1167-68.
9 Id. at i68.
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absence of tax should have $533 after tax whatever combination
of earnings and savings may have gone to produce the $Soo. An
accretion tax is "discriminatory" because it will leave less for the
retiree after 24 years than for another taxpayer with $8oo of cur-
rent income, presumably in year 2 5.
If Andrews' point is that otherwise similarly situated tax-
payers are taxed differently solely because of differences in pref-
erences "for particular goods or services, now or in the future,"
these taxpayers are neither otherwise similarly situated nor do
they reveal different preferences in year 25. Relative to the tax-
payer with current income, the retiree does not defer consumption:
they both consume in year 25. Furthermore, the fact that the two
taxpayers have different earning streams, and have not been pre-
sented with the same options before year 25, suggests their posi-
tions are not strictly comparable. The retiree may (or may not)
pay for his consumption out of saved compensation while the tax-
payer with current earnings may (or may not) pay for his con-
sumption out of current income. But even if one pays with saved
compensation while the other pays with current earnings, that
does rot establish discrimination since, as Andrews elsewhere
indicates, fairness in taxation is to be measured between indi-
viduals, not funds.20
The two taxpayers are, of course, in identical positions with
regard to consumption since they consume the same amount in
year 25. If the appropriate index of equality for tax purposes is
concluded to be consumption, then any tax, including an accretion-
type tax, that treats equal consumers differently is discriminatory.
However, that discrimination cannot be used to support the con-
clusion that the appropriate index of equality is consumption, as
that conclusion was a necessary predicate for the finding of dis-
crimination. To avoid circularity in the argument, a finding that
the accretion-type tax discriminates among taxpayers on the basis
of their preferences for present and future consumption must not
depend on a prior assumption that consumption is the fairer tax
base.
The discrimination of an accretion-type tax against taxpayers
who have relatively greater preferences for future consumption
can be clarified by comparing two workers, both of whom earn
$ioo in an initial year i." In a world without taxes, each has the
2 Id. at 1133.
2 To make comparisons easier, the examples in the text will follow as closely
as possible those in Andrews. Accordingly, interest will be calculated by the
rule of thumb used there, see id. at i125 n.20, with the results rounded. Also
following Andrews, the tax rate will be expressed as if the tax were part of the
tax base, see id. at ii19 n.io, and the appropriate comparison will be assumed to
be between equivalent rate taxes rather than between taxes yielding equivalent
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choice of consuming $ioo in that year or $8oo after 24 years (with
interest compounding at 9%). The price of consumption in the
initial year relative to consumption after 24 years is loo/8oo, or
i/8. Imposition of a consumption-type income tax leaves the
ratio at 67/533, or 1/8. If one taxpayer spends in year i and
the other spends in year 25, both consume less after taxes, but
their relative positions remain as they were in the non-tax world.
Imposition of an accretion-type tax changes the ratio to 67/267,
or 1/4, so the taxpayer with a greater relative preference for
future consumption is taxed more heavily. Hence, although
neither tax discriminates on the basis of "need or taste for
particular goods or services, now or in the future," 2 2 an accretion-
type tax does discriminate against taxpayers with relatively
greater preferences for future, as compared with present con-
sumption.
This discrimination - which John Stuart Mill called a double
tax on savings23 - results from the fact that imposing a tax on
accretion reduces the after-tax return on invested savings.24 De-
spite the existence of a lengthy historical debate in rebuttal of
Mills' position,25 it seems to be beyond present doubt that relative
positions of taxpayers are changed by an accretion-type, but not
a consumption-type, tax. The traditional counterargument - that
an accretion-type tax is discriminatory only if one embraces the
consumption model 2- is not persuasive because the accretion-
type tax discriminates among taxpayers relative to the no-tax
world, whereas the cQnsumption-type tax does not.
revenues. One practical problem with substituting a consumption-type tax for
the present income tax is that the new tax would increase future revenues at the
expense of current revenues. If the Treasury were unwilling to accept an imme-
diate decline in tax receipts, rates under a consumption-type tax would have to
be raised to maintain revenue yield. For calculation of comparable rates where
the tax base is net of tax and where revenues are assumed to be equivalent, see
N. KALDOR, supra note IS, at 232; A. PREST, supra note 1o, at 48 n.i, 8o-81; C.
SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 346 (1969).
Examples similar to that in the text can be found in R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL
INCOmE TAX 25-28 (1964); A. PREST, supra note 10, at 8o; W. VICXERY, AGENDA
FOR PROGREssIVE TAXATION 336 (1947).
22 Andrews at ix67-68 (emphasis added). A selective excise tax, on the other
hand, would discriminate among particular goods and services.2 2 J.S. MI, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL EcoNoMY, bk. V, ch. II, § 3 (9th ed,
1895).
24 Id.
2 5See Andrews at 1168 n.122.
26 See, e.g., Musgrave, A Further Note on the Double Taxation oj Savings, 29
AM. Eco'. REv. 549 (i939).
2 7 On the other hand, if saving were considered to offer imputed expenditures
on such intangibles as prestige, power, and security, a consumption-type tax would
discriminate in favor of that form of expenditure. See C. SHOUP, supra note 21,
at 352; cf. pp. 941-42 infra.
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Although the discrimination occasioned by an accretion-type
tax seems real enough, it is probably overstated in the preceeding
examples because of the implicit assumption that such a tax will
not affect the gross rate of interest. Invested savings in all ex-
amples up to this point have earned a gross rate of return of 9%
with or without a tax; only the net return fell, from 0% to 6%,
when a 33% accretion-type tax was imposed. But if imposition
of the tax also raises the gross rate of return, the discrimination
is reduced or eliminated. Assume again that the pretax interest
rate were 9%, so the retiree who saved and invested $ioo in year
i would have $8oo after 24 years, and the ratio between the prices
of present and future consumption would be ioo/8oo, or i/8 in a
world without taxes. If imposition of an accretion-type tax caused
the gross interest rate to rise to 13.5% (because savers continued
to require a 9% net return while borrowers' demand for saved
funds was relatively fixed), imposition of a 33% accretion-type
tax would present our wage earners with the choice of consuming
$67 in year i or $533 after 24 years, maintaining the ratio at
67/533 or i/8. A consumption-type income tax would also leave
the wage earners with the choice between $67 in year i or $533
after 24 years since the net rate of return, here 9%, would be the
same as the gross rate of return when annual yield is not taxed.
Finally, a retiree who saved and invested $ioo in year i would
have the same amount after taxes, $533, to consume 24 years
later as would a taxpayer with $8oo in current income. Thus, if
the rise in gross interest rates fully offsets the tax imposed on
income producing assets, an accretion-type tax would not dis-
criminate against future consumption, whether equal earners or
equal consumers are compared.
Unfortunately, there is no a priori method of determining
what will be the actual effect of an accretion tax on rates of return.
The impact of accretion-type taxation on the level of investment
and rates of return will depend on the characteristics of the de-
mand for, and supply of, investable funds.2 8 Without knowing
those characteristics it is impossible to identify the effects of an
accretion-type tax on the interest rate and, accordingly, the
amount of discrimination occasioned by the tax. One might
nevertheless respond that elimination of an accretion-type tax is
highly unlikely to cause interest rates to fall by the full amount
of the tax, as in my extreme example, so some discrimination
against future consumption is bound to remain."9 Yet the quantum
of discrimination is surely relevant for Andrews' fairness, as well
as his efficiency, analysis if the discrimination is to be balanced
2 8 See J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE - ECONOMICS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 301-03 (5th ed. 1973).
2 See C. SHouP, supra note 21, at 346.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
against equity arguments in favor of an accretion-type tax.
Though some discrimination will occur as a result of an accretion-
type tax, it may be considerably overstated by examples which
assume no change in the gross rate of interest.
B. The Equivalence of a Consumption-Type Income Tax
and a Tax on Wages Alone
Andrews carefully demonstrates that when tax rates are con-
stant, deferral of a tax on an investment is equivalent to exemp-
tion of the investment's subsequent yield and appreciation.3  He
also asserts at several points that the difference between an ac-
cretion-type and a consumption-type tax is essentially one of
deferral.31 Considering those two statements together leads to
the somewhat surprising conclusion that when tax rates are con-
stant, a consumption-type personal income tax is the equivalent
of a tax which permanently exempts all income from property,
that is, a tax only on wages.
i. Assuming Constant Tax Rates. -That a consumption-
type tax is equivalent to a tax on wages alone when tax rates re-
main constant can be seen by applying a wage tax of 33% to
Andrews' retiree in the initial year, so he has only $67 left to
spend or save in that year. If saved and invested at 9%, that
amount will produce $533 to spend after 24 years since, by hy-
pothesis, the wage tax does not reach income from property. That
is exactly the result for the retiree in Andrew's example, where
nothing would have been taxed in the initial year because there
was no consumption, and the full $8oo taxed when consumed 24
years later. Thus, if tax rates are constant, a wage tax, which
does not reach income from property, will always leave taxpayers
in the same positions as a consumption tax, which defers taxation
when funds are saved. 2
It may be objected that a consumption-type income tax is not
equivalent to a wage tax because under the former even an idle
taxpayer who has never earned wages and who lives entirely on
interest receipts will have to pay taxes as the interest is spent.
"
0 Andrews at 1123-28, 1167.
3 1 1d. at iii5, 1120, 1124, 1167.
12 Although the net of tax results will always be the same, it may be objected
that there is a formal difference between the two taxes in that wage taxes are paid
immediately, here in year i, while the payment of consumption taxes is delayed,
here until after 24 years. The difference in the date of payment of the two taxes
can be eliminated by giving the wage earner the opportunity to defer his wage
tax until consumption, with income earned on the deferred tax going to the gov-
ernment. In terms of our examples, the wage earner could either pay a $33 wage
tax in year i or invest that $33 for 24 years at 9%, when $267 would be due
the government as a deferred wage tax, again leaving $533 for consumption.
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But if the interest-producing asset were purchased with wages
earned after the imposition of the consumption-type tax, taxation
of the idle taxpayer's consumption will again produce exactly the
same result as would earlier wage taxation of the individual whose
wages were invested to provide the idler with interest. Andrews'
ideal consumption-type tax would provide that a transfer of
property by gift or bequest would not be a taxable event, so de-
ferral - the equivalent of exemption from taxation of income
from property - can continue for generations, until consumption
occurs. 3 If the interest-producing property had been purchased
with wages saved under the current income tax, a transitional
problem would arise in that taxation of the wage-earner, who
would have received no deduction for saving under the existing
tax, and taxation of the consumer would be double taxation to a
supporter of the consumption model. As a partial solution, An-
drews suggests exempting cash balances from the consumption
tax if their accumulation was recently taxed at ordinary income
rates. 4 The problem of what to do about consumption where
accumulation has already been taxed is, in any event, a purely
transitional one which does not undermine the basic equivalence
of the wage and consumption-type taxes.
Finally, it may be asserted that the equivalence between de-
ferral on investment and exemption of income or "yield" from
property fails if the income contains elements of windfall invest-
ment profit. Andrews makes this point in distinguishing "wind-
fall profit" from "simple investment yield." " Presumably the
former means unanticipated appreciation while the latter includes
only anticipated yield. Under that definition, all our examples
thus far have been restricted to "simple investment yield."
Suppose that for some totally unanticipated external reason,
the investment asset purchased by the retiree for $ioo in the
initial year doubled in value at once. The resulting $200 invested
at 9% would yield $16oo after 24 years, and a consumption tax
of 33% applied at that time would leave $io66 after taxes. A
wage tax of 33% in the initial year would leave $67 after taxes
"Andrews at 1162.
" Andrews is, however, unwilling to apply this solution to all investment assets
purchased before the transition to a consumption-type tax, explaining only that
to do so "would impair the integrity of the consumption-type tax too much and
too long, and often with too little real justification." Id. at 1177 n.4o. Failure
to give full credit for the pretransition basis of investment assets would, however,
seem to involve the "double taxation of saving" and discrimination against de-
ferred consumption found so objectionable in the accretion-type tax.
35 Id. at 1182-83 n.iso. At other points, however, Andrews indicates deferral
is equivalent to exemption of investment income when both "yield and apprecia-
tion" (all "subsequent profit") are exempted, id. at i126, 1167, a view which is
consistent with the position taken in the text here.
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to invest in that year, $133 after the unanticipated doubling, and
$io66 after 24 years at 9%. Thus, the equivalence between a
wage tax and a consumption tax holds even though the exempted
"yield" contains elements of "windfall profit."
This equivalence compels reevaluation of Andrews' conclu-
sion that source discrimination is no more appropriate under a
consumption-type tax than under an accretion-type tax. Thus,
exemption of interest on state and municipal bonds is said to be a
departure from either ideal,3" but as Andrews also indicates, a
deduction for investment in municipal bonds reduces the effective
rate of tax on that interest to zero no less certainly than does the
exemption.3 While it offers no justification for source discrimi-
nation among various kinds of wages or property income, the
consumption ideal thus effectively exempts all property income
from taxation while including all income from personal services.
This result should not be too surprising once it is recalled that
Andrews' proposal is designed to eliminate the tax on benefits that
flow from deferring consumption. Since potential consumption
increases over time only to the extent one invests in accretion-
producing assets, those benefits are none other than income from
property.
2. When Tax Rates Are Not Constant. - If different tax
rates are applicable, a wage tax and a consumption-type tax are
no longer precisely equivalent. The retiree who earns $ioo and
pays a 33 % wage tax in year i will have $533 left after 24 years
at 9%, but if the consumption tax rate after 24 years were only
20%, that tax would leave $640 for consumption. Such a dis-
parity in rates between years may arise because the statutory
schedules have been changed, because the taxpayer is subject to
a different rate under a graduated tax, or because different tax-
payers are involved.
The only relevant difference between a consumption-type
personal income tax and a wage tax is thus the disparity that
arises when tax rates are not constant.3 But, identification of a
361d. at 1178.
37 Id. at 1181 n.149.
3The taxes will produce different results if (I) accumulation continues for-
ever so there is never any consumption to tax; (2) consumption occurs without
there ever having been prior earnings to tax; or (3) taxpayers irrationally ignore
the effects of taxation and insist on saving a given fraction of pretax wages for
future consumption. See R. MusGRAvE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 262,
266-67 (1959). If the exempted return on assets under a wage tax contains an
element of compensation for personal services, i.e., hidden wages, then the two
taxes will be equivalent only if the wage tax can successfully identify wages, sug-
gesting the administrative superiority of the consumption tax over the wage tax.
See Andrews at 1x83 n.15o. Finally, the taxes may have different effects if their
rates are adjusted to produce equivalent revenues. See note 21 supra.
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consumption-type tax with a wage tax does not, by itself, indi-
cate that either is less fair than an accretion-type tax. Indeed, to
the extent discrimination against taxpayers with a relatively
greater preference for accumulation is thought unfair, the former
appear superior on equity grounds. Comprehending the identity
between a wage and consumption tax does, however, make more
apparent an important consequence of the latter tax base, which
is that income from property escapes tax except to the extent that
the applicable tax rate in the year of consumption is higher than
the applicable rate in the year the invested wages were earned.
Once that consequence is perceived, the question of the relative
fairness of consumption-type and accretion-type taxes can be
resolved only by balancing the equity argument for the former
against equity considerations which call for taxation of all income
from property. With the issue thus framed, we now turn to An-
drews' discussion of the usual equity argument for including in-
come from property in the tax base - the mitigation of disparities
in wealth.
III. AcCUMULATION AND WEALTH
A. Disparities in Wealth
As Andrews puts it, the main reason for preferring an accre-
tion-type tax to a consumption-type tax is the notion that it may
reduce disparities in wealth as well as living standards.3 9 The
current income tax is understandably rejected as ineffective in
this regard. More importantly for our purposes, Andrews also
argues that even if existing disparities in wealth could be ade-
quately dealt with, taxation of accumulation as personal income
might not be a desirable way to deal with the problem of wealth:
to the extent accumulation represents deferred consumption, ac-
cretion-type taxation would be undesirable because of the result-
ing discrimination against future consumption; to the extent it
exceeds deferred consumption wants, accumulation is consumption
foregone, and such taxation would be undesirable for reasons
which have been discussed above.3" For Andrews the arguments
against taxing accumulation which is foregone or deferred con-
sumption outweigh any equity argument for taxing income from
property in order to reduce disparities in wealth.
Andrews nevertheless concedes that "wealth is a source of
power," which "represents a different dimension along which to
measure economic well-being." 4  Given that conclusion, the
3" Andrews at 169.
4'Id. at 1169-7o.
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reader may be surprised to find that not only is accumulation ex-
cluded from Andrews' personal income tax base, but also that he
advances no proposal for a periodic tax on net wealth. On reflec-
tion, however, it should be clear that Andrews cannot support a
periodic wealth tax to mitigate such disparities because that tax
would discriminate against taxpayers with a relatively greater
preference for future consumption, and is therefore inconsistent
with the most sophisticated argument against the accretion-type
income tax.41 Indeed, any attempt to reduce discrepancies in
wealth during an accumulator's lifetime is inconsistent with that
argument since reduction of accumulation will necessarily raise
the price of future consumption relative to present consumption.
Andrews attempts to avoid this difficulty, while adhering to
the goal of reducing wealth discrepancies, by calling for stronger
estate and gift taxes. However, these transfer taxes would raise
the price of each taxpayer's future transfers as compared with his
present consumption, which would result in discrimination against
taxpayers who have a relatively greater preference to save in
order to transfer wealth to their families. Andrews neither identi-
fies that discrimination nor explains why it is acceptable when
discrimination against taxpayers who have a relatively greater
preference to save for their own consumption is not.42 However,
two answers might suggest themselves. First, the discrimination
in favor of taxpayers with a relatively greater preference for
present consumption caused by the estate and gift taxes may not
be quantitatively as great as that caused by an accretion-type tax.
Andrews does not, however, suggest or offer support for this ra-
tionale. Second, it may be that future transfers are thought to be
qualitatively different from future consumption, so discrimina-
tion against the former, but not the latter, vis-h-vis present con-
sumption is acceptable as a matter of equity. It is presumably
this type of reasoning which leads Andrews to characterize trans-
fers as creating "a kind of unearned original disparity in wealth
in the hands of a new generation." " If so, the implied equity
balance in Andrews' article is that elimination of wealth dispari-
ties between generations outweighs, as a matter of social justice,
the resulting discrimination among taxpayers, while elimination
of wealth disparities during the lifetime of accumulators is out-
weighed, as a matter of social justice, by the resulting discrimina-
41 See N. KAIDOR, supra note 15, at go.
42 The closest Andrews comes to suggesting the existence of this discrimination
is by stating that deferral of the tax on accumulation until consumption or transfer
"eliminates the discrimination against deferred consumption that would charac-
terize a true accretion-type tax, at least when dejerred consumption is by the
same taxpayer." Andrews at 1172 (emphasis added).
43 Id.
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tion among taxpayers. Andrews does not argue for this balance
as an original matter,44 and this is not the place to examine it.
Rather, what is crucial here is that the superiority, in terms of
equity, of a consumption-type personal income tax over an accre-
tion-type personal income tax depends on acceptance of that
balance.
If one concluded, for instance, that taxpayers should not be
able to accumulate an unlimited amount of wealth and the corre-
sponding social power during their lifetimes without paying taxes
on the accumulation, Andrews' argument would have to be re-
jected. That conclusion might be based either directly on a view
of an equitable distribution of lifetime wealth, or on the pragmatic
conclusion that taxing wealth once a generation would not suf-
ficiently reduce disparities. 5 In either case, the appropriate re-
sponse to Hobbes' question would be that taxing a man on what
he has earned but not consumed is necessary to achieve a fairer
distribution of wealth. Reduction of the after-tax return on in-
vested savings - the discrimination against deferred consumption
- could also be justified as necessary to mitigate lifetime wealth
disparities. One might, of course, prefer a wealth tax over an
accretion tax as the more effective method of mitigating such dis-
parities,4 6 but if the choice is limited to the consumption and
accretion models for the personal income tax the latter would be
preferable in terms of fairness.
In his discussion of existing wealth disparities, Andrews argues
that a consumption-type tax would be preferable because it would
be more progressive with regard to wealth than would an accre-
" Others have:
It can also be argued that if an Expenditure Tax, as opposed to an income
tax, enhances the opportunity for exceptional men to make fortunes through
enterprise, there is a clear social gain in increased capital accumulation,
which more than offsets any tangible loss in the guise of greater social or
economic inequality. (This does not of course apply to inherited wealth
N. KALDOR, supra note 15, at 50.
[B]ut if all were done which it would be in the power of a good govern-
ment to do . . . to diminish the inequality of opportunities, the difference
of fortune arising from people's own earnings could not justly give umbrage.
J.S. MILL, supra note 23, bk. V, ch. 2, § 3 at 808.
5 Thurow, Net Worth Taxes, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 417, 420 (1972), calculates that
an inheritance tax of ioo% on transfers over $50,000 would permit an individual
who received $5o,ooo at age zero and lived until 70 to accumulate $I.i million by
age 35 and $39.5 million by age 70 if the inheritance were invested at io% and
absolutely nothing saved from earned income. If half the return on capital income
were consumed annually instead of reinvested, there would still be $1.5 million of
accumulation at age 7o. Thurow concludes from such examples that even a very
severe estate and gift tax would not place a very stringent constraint on the maxi-
mum amount of wealth an individual could possess. Id.
46 See generally id. passin.
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tion-type tax on the assumption that at any given income level,
"those with more wealth will feel free to spend more and save
less." 17 Even if this assumption were conceded, the conclusion
that the consumption-type tax will be more progressive cannot
be maintained if the comparison of taxpayers is not limited to a
single year. Under a consumption tax, the high consumers are
merely paying the deferred tax on their invested savings, while
the high savers are simply deferring taxes until future consump-
tion. Unless tax rates change, their burdens over time may be
identical because, as Andrews demonstrates, the benefits of de-
ferral achieved by the saver will be matched by a corresponding
increase in future consumption tax liability.4 8 The problem with
a single-year comparison is even clearer when the consumption-
type tax is viewed as the equivalent of a wage tax: if tax rates
are constant, the high consumer and the high saver both pay what
amounts to a deferred tax on prior wages; the amount of their
current wealth is irrelevant. In fact, if the tax were structured
as an equivalent wage tax, the low wealth taxpayer - who would
have greater wages than the high wealth taxpayer with equivalent
income because some of the latter's income would presumably
come from property - would pay more in taxes in the single year
in question, making the result regressive with regard to wealth.
B. Redistribution and Graduated Rates
Andrews also suggests that a consumption-type personal in-
come tax can be as progressive as an accretion-type tax because
graduated rates can be applied under either.4 9 As long as attention
is focused on the retiree and the taxpayer with $8oo of current
income in year 25, there is nothing inconsistent about introducing
graduated rates into the consumption-type tax. Once attention is
shifted to a comparison between two taxpayers who earn the same
amount, but who have different relative preferences for present
and future consumption, graduated rates under a consumption-
type tax would result in discrimination against future consump-
tion.50
Assuming a 33% tax rate on the first $Ioo and a 5o% tax rate
on everything above that, the worker who earns $ioo in an initial
year would have $67 in after-tax consumption in that year. The
retiree who saves $ioo in an initial year and invests it for 24 years
at 9% would have only $417 in after-tax consumption.5' It will
4 7 Andrews at 117.4
s
8 d. at 1123-28, 1150.
4 9 Id. at 1174-75.
soSee C. SHouP, supra note 21, at 352.
" This result can be seen from the following computation:
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be recalled that the retiree must have $533 in after-tax consump-
tion to maintain his position relative to the worker who has $67
in after-tax consumption in the initial year.52 General averaging
provisions would eliminate some, but not all, of this disparity. 3
In a world without taxation, the relative positions of the tax-
payer who earns $8oo in year 25, the retiree who saves and invests
$ioo at 9% in the initial year, and the worker who spends $ioo
in the initial year are determined by the available rate of return:
a dollar in the initial year is worth 8 dollars after 24 years. A pro-
portional consumption tax maintains their relative positions: the
retiree will be able to consume the same amount as the taxpayer
with $8oo of current earnings 24 years later, while they both
will be able to consume eight times what the worker could con-
sume in the initial year. Once graduated rates are introduced,
however, the equality between the retiree and the taxpayer with
income 24 years later can be maintained only by distorting the
relative positions of the retiree and the worker who consumed in
the initial year. Since the only difference between the retiree and
that worker is their relative preference for present and future
consumption, the resulting discrimination against the retiree -
the taxpayer with the relatively greater preference for future con-
sumption - is inconsistent with the best argument for adopting
the consumption model to begin with. Thus the consumption-type
personal income tax must either be limited to a proportional rate
or suffer the defect Andrews finds so fatal in the accretion model.54
After-tax income = 8oo - [0.33 X Ioo] - [0.50 X (800 - ioo) ]
= 80o - 33 - 350
= 417
52 See pp. 935-36 supra.
Such provisions are suggested in Andrews at 1157. Without averaging, a
graduated consumption-type tax could result in a greater tax burden for current
consumers than for deferred consumers, depending on their spending patterns. For
example, a consumer who earned and spent $io,ooo in a single year might pay
more in taxes than an otherwise comparable taxpayer who earned $io,ooo in one
year, but divided his spending evenly between two years. The differential in
taxation, which favors the deferred consumer in this example, results from bunch-
ing of expenditures and would be eliminated by lifetime averaging.
But if consumption were averaged over a lifetime, a graduated consumption-
type tax would discriminate against deferred consumption. A current consumer
would have less total-dollar consumption than an equal wage earner who defers
consumption since the latter increases the dollar amount available for consumption
by the return on invested savings. Inclusion of that increment under a propor-
tional consumption-type tax just offsets the benefits of deferral. Graduated
brackets would subject the increment received by deferred consumers to higher
rates, so future consumption would be made more expensive relative to present
consumption.
" A graduated wage tax would not be subject to this objection, but Andrews
concludes that the best argument for progressivity requires tax rates to be applied
in the spending, rather than earning, period. See id. at 176-77.
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IV. CONCLUSION
That taxpayers may respond to a tax by reducing consump-
tion in order to pay the government its due does not establish that
the fairest index of taxability is consumption. Nor does the
Hobbesian view of accumulation as the excess of what one has
contributed to production over what one has withdrawn neces-
sarily make taxation of the excess unfair, since the accumulator
continues to control the excess for his own benefit.
Assuming the appropriate effect on interest rates, an accretion-
type personal income tax will change the relative positions of
taxpayers who have different preferences for present and future
consumption by reducing the after-tax return on invested savings.
To the extent that reduction is considered unfairly discriminatory,
it must be weighed against the inability of a consumption-type
personal income tax to mitigate lifetime disparities in wealth.
That inability derives from the effective exclusion from the tax
base of income from property, making a consumption-type tax
the equivalent of a wage tax when rates are constant. If mitiga-
tion of lifetime wealth disparities were considered an important
goal of a fair tax system, reducing the after-tax return on invested
savings might be tolerated as a necessary cost of achieving that
goal.
Introducing graduated rates into the consumption tax does not
help to resolve the dilemma since their effect is inconsistent with
the reason for rejecting an accretion-type tax to begin with. In-
stead, the choice between the consumption and accretion models
for the personal income tax, as a matter of fairness, comes down
to a choice between mitigation of lifetime wealth disparities and
preservation of the pretax relative price of present and future
consumption as the more important equity goal. One's ethical
predilections rather than logic - at least legal or economic logic
- have to provide the grounds for making that choice.
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